Local Admin Access: Why It Matters, What We Recommend, and Your Options

When you log into a work computer, Windows can treat you as either a standard user or a local administrator (“local admin”). Local admin access sounds convenient—install apps, change settings, “just make it work”—but it also dramatically increases security risk.

This post explains (in plain English) why we ask about local admin access, what best practices recommend, and a few easy ways to handle updates and software installs without giving everyone full admin rights.

What “local admin” actually means

A local admin can typically:

  • Install or remove software

  • Disable or alter security tools

  • Change system settings and services

  • Create new local accounts

  • Run software with elevated permissions (which can affect the whole PC)

In other words: anything malicious that runs under a local admin can do far more damage.

Microsoft’s guidance generally supports using non-admin accounts for daily work and elevating only when needed. Microsoft Learn+1

Why MSPs ask (the real reason)

Most cyberattacks don’t start with “Hollywood hacking.” They start with:

  • A user opening a malicious file/link

  • A fake “update” prompt

  • A compromised browser extension

  • A trojanized installer from the web

If the user is a local admin, malware often gets:

  • Easier persistence (it stays installed)

  • Easier credential theft and lateral movement

  • Easier disabling of defenses

That’s why security frameworks consistently push least privilege (only the access needed to do the job).

Best-practice guidance (quick and credible)

Here’s how major standards and guidance line up:

NIST / CMMC (common in CMMC Level 2 environments)

  • NIST SP 800-171 explicitly calls for least privilege and using non-privileged accounts for non-security functions. NIST Publications+1

  • CMMC Level 2 maps to NIST 800-171 and includes a least-privilege practice (AC.L2-3.1.5). DoD Open Government+1

CIS Controls (widely used cybersecurity baseline)

  • CIS Safeguard 5.4: restrict administrator privileges to dedicated admin accounts and do everyday work from non-privileged accounts. CIS+1

HIPAA Security Rule (healthcare environments)

HIPAA requires policies and procedures for authorizing access to ePHI (information access management). Least privilege is a common way organizations satisfy this expectation in practice. Legal Information Institute+1

PCI DSS (payment card environments)

PCI’s access control requirements are based on business need-to-know (least privilege). PCI Security Standards Council+1

Common choices (and what they look like day-to-day)

Option 1: Standard users (recommended for most organizations)

Best security + best compliance alignment.

  • Users work normally (email, browser, Office, line-of-business apps)

  • Admin actions require approval/elevation

Tradeoff: installs/changes require a process (below).

Option 2: “Admin by request” (best balance)

Users remain standard users, but we can:

  • Approve installs quickly

  • Grant temporary elevation (time-limited) when justified

  • Maintain auditability (who/what/when)

This is a strong fit for businesses that need speed but also want control.

Option 3: Dedicated admin accounts (for power users/IT only)

If someone truly needs admin rights:

  • They use a normal account for daily work

  • A separate admin account is used only when required (no email/browsing as admin)

This aligns well with CIS and Microsoft least-privilege guidance. CIS+1

Option 4: Local admin allowed (least recommended)

Sometimes organizations choose this for operational reasons. If so, we strongly recommend adding compensating controls:

  • Strong MFA where possible

  • Enhanced endpoint protections and logging

  • Application control / allow-listing

  • Tight patching SLAs and rapid response procedures

“But how do users get updates or install software?”

Great question—and it’s the #1 reason people ask for admin rights. Here are better approaches:

A) MSP-managed updates (recommended)

We handle:

  • Windows updates

  • Microsoft 365 updates

  • Third-party app patching (where supported)

This is the cleanest path and reduces user disruption.

B) Self-service software catalog (where available)

In many environments we can provide a “company portal” style experience:

  • Users request approved apps

  • Installs run with admin rights in the background

  • You get consistency and less shadow-IT

C) “Request & approve” workflow (fast and auditable)

When a user needs an installer:

  • They submit the request

  • We validate it’s legitimate and safe

  • We approve and install, or grant time-limited elevation

This also supports compliance documentation (especially helpful for CMMC/PCI audits).

What we recommend (simple)

For most MSP clients, the best default is:

Standard users + admin by request
It keeps people productive while staying aligned with least-privilege requirements in NIST/CMMC, CIS, HIPAA expectations for controlled access, and PCI’s need-to-know model. PCI Security Standards Council+3NIST Publications+3CIS+3

Want us to document this for compliance?

If you’re in a regulated space (HIPAA, CMMC, PCI, etc.), we can provide:

  • A written policy statement (what you chose and why)

  • Evidence/audit notes (how admin rights are controlled)

  • A repeatable approval workflow for installs and exceptions

Al Davis